When my mother-in-law passed me this book (750-pages) 3
weekends ago, I had some doubts if I could finish it. But this book proved to
be a magnet. Anyone interested in South East Asia’s modern history will learn much
from this book.
"This is not a how-to book, whether to build an economy, an army, or a nation. It is an account of the problems my colleagues and I faced, and how we set about solving them."
At 35, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew was prime minister of self-governing
Singapore from 1959. In 1963, Singapore had formed the Malaysian Federation
with Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah.
Mr. Lee never expected to take charge of an independent
Singapore at the age of 42, in 1965. Practically no one thought Singapore could
survive. No natural resources, no jobs, no army/self-defence, the early days
were a mess, with a lot of firefighting.
Those were also the days of Sukarno’s Konfratasi, covert
attacks on Malaysia and Singapore. The British naval base in Singapore was a
deterrent. On 18 November 1967, the British devaluated the pound sterling from
US$2.80 to USD$2.40, and Singapore’s reserve, which were still kept in London
in sterling lost 14.3%. Politics in the UK also meant that forces to the east
of Suez will withdraw by the end of 1971. Singapore would lose about 20% of GDP
and 30,000 jobs with the end of British military spending, and the future would
be uncertain. Mr. Lee tried to prolong the British presence in Singapore. The Vietnam
war was on-going, and the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) was a real threat. Alas,
he was able to negotiate some agreements with Australia, NZ and Malaysia to
form a pact, and by 1968, he took a 3-month sabbatical at Harvard, after running
office for 9 years.
Mr. Lee is staunchly anti-communist, though he worked with
them in the 50s. Forming the Malaysian Federation was to prevent the formation
of a communist regime in the former colonies. His encounter and negotiation with
the Plen could be made into a James Bond movie. He first met the Plen when he
was an assemblymen 1958, where the PAP worked with the MCP. Their final meeting
(in Singapore) was in May 1961. Mr. Lee then gave the Plen a public notice for
him to leave Singapore before Malaysia Day, September 1963. Both would meet at
Diayutai (VIP statehouse), Beijing in August 1995. The Plen wanted to return to
Singapore, but Mr. Lee didn’t agree, until he discloses his accounts with the
ISD by demonstrating that he had cut off his links with the CPM.
The Plen said the Malaysian Special Branch had invited
him to return; why could Mr. Lee not be as generous as the Malaysian government?
Mr. Lee told him the obvious: The CPM could not win over its Malay mass base,
unlike Singapore’s Chinese base. Mr. Lee suggested the Plen to accept the
Malaysian government’s offer. The Plen was not amused.
